The Supreme Court’s decision in URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2025] UKSC 21 marked a turning point in UK construction law, being the first time the Building Safety Act 2022 (BSA) and the Defective Premises Act 1972 (DPA) were both examined at the highest judicial level. The court clarified key legal duties under both statutes and redefined how responsibility can be shared between parties under the Civil Liability Act 1978.
After uncovering serious structural design defects in two high-rise developments, years after selling the properties, BDW, the developer behind Barratt and David Wilson Homes, stepped in to fund remedial works. Although it no longer owned the buildings, BDW then sued its former design consultant, URS, to recover those costs, sparking a landmark legal battle over duty of care and recoverability of losses.
BDW’s claim initially focussed on negligence as this was before the BSA came into effect. In 2021, the High Court ruled that BDW’s losses were recoverable and that its right to sue arose at practical completion when it still had an interest in the buildings. Once the BSA came into force, BDW added claims under the DPA and the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. URS appealed, but both the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court allowed the claims to proceed. Notably, the Supreme Court convened an enlarged panel in case it needed to revisit the controversial decision in Pirelli [1983], which had long governed when claims for building defects arise in tort. Though the Court ultimately left that question open, it flagged the issue for future cases - or even Parliament.
The Supreme Court gave URS permission to appeal on four grounds as follows:
Ground 1: Did BDW suffer a legally recoverable loss in negligence - or was any loss too remote or voluntarily incurred?
In URS v BDW, the Supreme Court confirmed that URS owed BDW a duty of care under the Hedley Byrne principle and had breached that duty by negligently designing defective buildings. While URS accepted that BDW could have recovered repair costs if it still owned the properties when the defects were fixed, it argued that BDW’s later actions undertaken after it had no legal obligation to repair were voluntary and thus irrecoverable. Citing a “voluntariness principle,” URS claimed that losses paid out for reputational or commercial reasons, rather than legal necessity, fell outside the scope of its duty. The Court rejected the idea of a rigid rule excluding voluntary payments, clarifying that recoverability should depend on causation and mitigation principles assessed at trial specifically whether the claimant’s actions were reasonable and whether they broke the chain of causation or failed to mitigate the loss. The appeal failed on this ground, but the Supreme Court considered three features of the facts that indicated that BDW was not acting voluntarily in paying for the repairs:
The Court concluded that BDW’s decision to carry out remedial works wasn’t truly voluntary, as it had no realistic alternative in light of serious safety risks. This aligns with the policy aims of the post-Grenfell Building Safety Act: life-threatening defects must be fixed, and those responsible for them should be held accountable.
Ground 2: Does section 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022 apply, and if so, how does it affect BDW’s claim?
A pivotal question was whether Section 135 of the BSA could apply retrospectively to support claims in negligence or contribution, even if those claims weren’t directly brought under the DPA.
BDW’s claim originally relied on negligence alone, having been issued before the BSA came into force. But when Section 135 was enacted in June 2022 extending limitation periods for DPA claims from 6 to 30 years BDW amended its case to reflect that its liability to homeowners was no longer time-barred. URS challenged this, arguing the new limitation could not apply retroactively to “non-DPA” claims like negligence or contribution.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument, confirming that Section 135(3) does have wider application. The Court found both textual and contextual support for interpreting Section 135 broadly:
The Supreme Court emphasized that retrospectivity is central to the BSA’s purpose, especially in the wake of Grenfell. They dismissed URS’s “rewriting history” concern, stating that all retrospective legislation necessarily alters legal reality, and that what matters for trial is whether BDW acted reasonably based on its understanding at the time.
Ground 3: Did URS owe BDW a statutory duty under section 1(1)(a) of the Defective Premises Act 1972, and are BDW’s losses recoverable under that duty?
The third ground of appeal tackled whether a developer who both commissions and later sells residential developments can bring a claim under section 1(1)(a) of the Defective Premises Act 1972 (DPA 1972) against professionals it engaged, like engineers or architects. The Supreme Court held that it could.
URS had argued that developers, because they owe duties themselves under section 1(4), couldn’t also benefit from the duties imposed by section 1(1)(a) claiming this would create a circular and illogical outcome. The DPA 1972, they said, was meant to protect vulnerable purchasers, not commercially sophisticated developers who already have the benefit of contracts and tort duties.
The Court rejected this narrow view. It found that:
As a result, URS owed BDW a direct statutory duty, and BDW’s remediation costs were a recoverable form of loss under the Act.
This ruling is a significant win for developers. It confirms they can rely on the DPA 1972 to bring claims for defective design or construction work an essential tool when faced with the escalating costs of post-Grenfell remediation.
Ground 4: Was BDW entitled to bring a contribution claim against URS under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 even though no third party has made a claim against BDW or reached a settlement?
In Ground 4, the Supreme Court examined whether BDW could recover a financial contribution from URS for remediation costs BDW had voluntarily incurred even though no claims had been brought against BDW by building owners or residents.
Under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, if two parties are both liable for the same damage, one (D1) can seek a contribution from the other (D2) based on relative responsibility. BDW argued that this right arises once damage occurs, even before any claim is made. URS disagreed, saying contribution isn’t triggered unless BDW’s liability has been proven via judgment, admission, or settlement which hadn't happened. The Supreme Court sided with neither party fully.
Giving the lead judgment, Lord Leggatt clarified that a right to contribution arises only when:
No court order or formal claim is needed just an identifiable payment or commitment to remedy the damage. Importantly, even non-cash payments (like carrying out repairs) count, as long as they’re capable of being valued.
The Court rejected URS’s restrictive approach and clarified that time limits for bringing contribution claims start to run once the amount paid is fixed, whether by agreement or performance.
This ground’s success ultimately depended on Ground 2, where the Court confirmed that Section 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022 applied retrospectively reviving BDW’s potential liability under the Defective Premises Act 1972. Since BDW’s legal exposure was real under the revised limitation regime, its claim for a contribution succeeded on the assumed facts.
The Supreme Court ultimately didn’t decide whether to overturn Pirelli, but it did flag important concerns. First, it noted that Pirelli rested on a flawed assumption that physical damage (like cracks) automatically meant more than pure economic loss. Second, even if the reasoning was dubious, the outcome (that a negligence claim accrues when damage occurs, not when discovered) might still hold. Third, the Court acknowledged that many other legal systems adopt the “discovery” rule but in England and Wales, the Latent Damage Act 1986 already provides for a 3-year window from discoverability with a 15-year longstop. Shifting to a full discovery-based accrual model would conflict with that legislative framework.
The Supreme Court’s judgment in URS v BDW delivers significant clarity across three key areas: the scope of claims under the Defective Premises Act 1972, rights of recovery under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, and the broader interpretive approach to the Building Safety Act 2022. Most notably, the Court underscored that accountability for building safety defects is central to the BSA’s purpose especially section 135 and that technical legal arguments should not be allowed to frustrate that objective. It’s a clear judicial signal that the courts will interpret the BSA purposively, in line with its post-Grenfell policy aims.
1. Developers can rely on the Defective Premises Act 1972
The Supreme Court confirmed that developers who commission residential work are owed a duty under section 1(1)(a) of the DPA 1972. This clears the way for upstream statutory claims against consultants and contractors even though developers themselves owe duties to purchasers.
2. Section 135 of the Building Safety Act applies retrospectively
The Court adopted a broad and purposive interpretation of section 135 BSA 2022, confirming that its extended limitation period (up to 30 years) applies not just to DPA claims but also to related negligence and contribution claims. Retrospectivity is now central to the BSA’s enforcement.
3. Contribution claims can arise before a developer is sued
A right to contribution exists once:
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