The safety of people in the built environment depends on a combination of good design, choice of suitable materials and sound methods of construction, and each of these depends in turn on the skill, knowledge and experience of those engaged in the construction industry.
Seven years after the deadly Grenfell Tower fire claimed 72 lives, the public inquiry’s final report has been published, with revelations of serious deficiencies in all four of these areas. It points the finger at almost every organisation involved in the building’s refurbishment and reached the grim conclusion that every single death was avoidable.
The cladding manufacturers
Manufacturers of the rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products incorporated into the building’s external wall were singled out for their ‘systematic dishonesty’. The Inquiry found that they had engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market.
The certification bodies
That these cynical strategies succeeded was partly down to the certification bodies who failed to ensure that the statements in their product certificates were accurate and based on test evidence.
The British Board of Agrément (BBA) prioritised the commercial interests of their customers over high standards and adherence to the contract intended to maintain those standards. Its scrutiny of the fire performance of products was seriously deficient and the contents of the certificates it produced were misleading, dictated by the manufacturers themselves.
Similarly LABC, the body formed by local authority building control departments in 2005 to provide support with technical matters and business services for members, failed to scrutinise claims made by the manufacturers, uncritically adopting the language they suggested and accommodating its customers at the expense of those who relied on the certificates.
The Building Research Establishment (BRE) did not escape criticism either. The Inquiry found that its systems were not sufficiently independent and it did not exercise the necessary degree of technical rigour. It allowed combustible products to be marketed for use in the external walls of buildings over 18 metres and placed too much reliance on the candour and co-operation of the organisations being assessed.
At the top of this chain, the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS), the body charged with oversight of the certification bodies, did not apply proper standards of monitoring and supervision.
Designers and contractors
None of those involved in the design of the external wall of Grenfell Tower or the choice of materials acted in accordance with the standards expected of a reasonably competent person in their position. They were not familiar with or did not understand the relevant provisions of the Building Regulations, Approved Document B or industry guidance. The Inquiry found that the risks of using combustible materials in the external walls of high-rise buildings were well known and they should have been aware of them.
Other parties
And the list goes on –
Government statutory guidance
At the pinnacle of this pyramid of incompetence, the Inquiry found that a ‘poorly run, complacent and defensive’ government department, in relentless pursuit of de-regulation, was ‘well aware’ of cladding risks before the Grenfell fire and failed to act.
The fire test methods available for determining the reaction to fire of materials, products and external wall systems (EWS) did not provide designers with the information needed to assess the risk of fire spreading across the external wall of a building.
The statutory guidance on complying with functional requirement B4(1) of the Building Regulations was fundamentally defective. The use of Class 0 as a standard of fire performance for products used on the external walls of tall buildings was wholly inappropriate. Neither of the main British Standard tests for that classification took into account the development of a fire on the outside of a building or provided the information needed to assess how an external wall incorporating the products would perform in a fire.
The performance criteria for large-scale system tests in BR 135 (‘Fire performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multistorey buildings’, no longer in use) were inadequate. An EWS could meet the criteria in BR 135 and still allow fire to spread through it and beyond the compartment of origin at a rate that was incompatible with a stay put strategy.
There was also a widespread but erroneous assumption that, if an EWS tested in accordance with BS 8414 met the performance criteria in BR 135, the building would comply with functional requirement B4(1) without any need to analyse the information obtained from the test or the conditions likely to be encountered in use. Approved Document B perpetuated that assumption, failing to make it clear that the results of the test always had to be analysed in conjunction with all other available information to understand the way in which a wall was likely to behave when exposed to the flames and heat of a fully developed compartment fire.
The Inquiry concluded that the package of reforms implemented by the UK government in response to Dame Judith Hackitt’s independent review of building regulations and fire safety, carried out in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell fire, do not go far enough.
The report sets out 58 recommendations centred on transparency and accountability. These are the main highlights.
A Construction Regulator and Chief Construction Adviser
The fragmentation of responsibility for fire safety between different government departments was a recipe for ineffectual regulation of the construction industry. The Building Safety Act 2022 (BSA) established a Building Safety Regulator responsible for building control of higher risk buildings (HRBs) and imposes duties on those involved in their construction and refurbishment, but overall responsibility remains dispersed.
The report recommends bringing together all fire safety responsibilities - currently spread between three government departments - into one department, with a Construction Regulator responsible for all fire safety-related functions, and a Chief Construction Adviser with sufficient staff and budget to advise the government on all matters affecting the construction industry.
Urgent review of Approved Document B
By the time of the Grenfell fire, many contractors, designers and building control officers were treating the statutory guidance in Approved Document B as a definitive statement of legal requirements.
The report urges prompt publication of a revised document containing a clear warning that compliance with the guidance does not necessarily result in compliance with the Building Regulations. It recommends that membership of bodies advising on changes to the statutory guidance should include representatives of the academic community as well as those with practical experience of the industry, and should extend beyond those who have served on similar bodies in the past.
Architects
The principal architect on the Grenfell refurbishment failed to exercise proper care over the choice of insulation and rainscreen panels and the fact that similar materials have since been found on hundreds of other high-rise buildings indicates a widespread failure among the profession to investigate properly or understand the nature of the materials being selected.
Both the Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects have taken steps since the fire to improve the education and training of architects. The report recommends that they review these changes to ensure they are sufficient in the light of the Inquiry’s findings.
The report also recommends that, when an application for HRB building control approval is submitted, a senior manager of the principal architect should provide a statement that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be safe as required by the Building Regulations.
Principal contractors
The report highlights shortcomings with the widely-used design and build form of contract which makes the principal contractor responsible for the whole range of activities relating to the work, even though it invariably engages sub-contractors to carry out different aspects of it.
It recommends introducing a licensing scheme operated by the new Construction Regulator for principal contractors undertaking the construction or refurbishment of HRBs, backed by a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor that it has taken all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is safe as required by the Building Regulations.
Fire engineers
Calculating the likely rate of fire spread and the time required for evacuation are matters for a qualified fire engineer. However, the term “fire engineer” does not at present denote any formal qualification.
The report recommends formal recognition of the profession of fire engineer, regulated by an independent body to define membership and maintain a register of members, alongside an urgent increase in the number of places on high-quality accredited masters level courses in fire engineering.
Fire risk assessors
The report expresses concerns about the competence of some commercial fire risk assessors and the absence of any regulatory scheme. It recommends a system of mandatory accreditation to certify their competence, with qualification standards and continuing professional development.
A fire safety strategy for HRBs
A fire safety strategy for a building should describe its structure and the various fire protection systems it contains, setting out how they work together to ensure the safety of the occupants in the event of a fire.
The report recommends making the production and submission of a fire safety strategy by a registered fire engineer a statutory requirement for all HRB building control applications, with a review and re-submission at completion. The strategy should take into account the needs of vulnerable people, including the additional time they may require to leave the building or reach a place of safety within it.
Urgent review of the definition of HRBs in the BSA
Defining a building as “higher-risk” by reference only to its height is not satisfactory and is essentially arbitrary in nature. This view has been echoed by many commentators since the BSA’s enactment.
More relevant, says the report, is the nature of a building’s use, particularly the likely presence of vulnerable people, for whom evacuation in the event of a fire or other emergency would be likely to present difficulty. It recommends an urgent review of the definition of HRBs in the BSA.
Fire safety performance tests
The factors that affect the way in which fire spreads over a rainscreen EWS are complex and understanding them is an evolving science.
The government should make it clear that the current British Standard 9414 should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer. New test methods should be devised by the professional and academic community to provide the information needed for reliable assessments.
Certification of products and publication of test data
The fact that three separate cladding manufacturers were able to obtain misleading certificates for their products points to a serious failure of the current system and highlights the need for a different approach to the certification of construction products.
Product manufacturers should be required to provide all relevant test results to support their fire safety claims, along with a full history of tests, including failures, in product certificates. The Construction Regulator should carry out the necessary assessments to ensure the conformity of construction products with legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards, and issue or withhold certificates as appropriate.
Manufacturers should also have to proactively tell the Regulator if the performance of their product changes.
Building control
Evidence at the Inquiry showed that in the period leading up to the fire many of those involved in major construction projects regarded building control primarily as a source of advice and assistance, a serious misunderstanding fostered by the building control bodies themselves.
The introduction of commercial interests into the building control system has created conflict with the performance of building control’s role as guardians of the public interest. The report recommends setting up an independent panel to consider whether it is appropriate for private sector firms to operate in this fashion and whether all building control work should be carried out by a national authority rather than local government.
Response to recommendations
Some important recommendations affecting fire safety were ignored by the government in the years leading up to the fire. The report proposes that the government maintains a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries, with a description of the steps taken in response, and an annual report to Parliament. Where the government does not accept a recommendation, it should record its reasons for doing so.
Social housing providers
The report is highly critical of the KCTMO and urges social housing providers to give careful consideration to the criticisms in the report and take appropriate action accordingly. However, it stopped short of making any specific recommendations, in the wake of the Social Housing (Regulation) Act 2023, which enables the Regulator of Social Housing to play a more active role in setting appropriate standards and ensuring that they are met. The Act also places more duties on social landlords to prioritise safety, including imposing a duty to investigate and remedy within a specified time of being reported defects that may adversely affect health.
Both the Construction Leadership Council and the Construction Products Association have welcomed the publication of the report and acknowledged its findings.
The Fire Brigades Union has said that the government should go beyond what is set out in the report and bring the systems for delivering building safety under public ownership, reversing the semi-privatised system of building control that puts commercial interests ahead of regulatory duties.
The Prime Minister has promised that the government will carefully consider the report and its recommendations within the next six months. The government will also block companies criticised in the report from future public contracts, which was not a report recommendation but something Grenfell United had called for.
Does the Inquiry’s report signal an end to the “unedifying merry-go-round of buck-passing”, to coin a phrase used by leading Counsel during the Inquiry? Probably not, but it may be the beginning of the end.
A criminal investigation into the parts played by the individual companies, which began in 2017 and was then delayed until the inquiry concluded, will now ensue. Nineteen organisations and 58 people are currently under investigation over their roles in the events that lead to the fire. However, the sheer volume of evidence and complexity of the investigation means that no-one is likely to be charged until the end of 2026, much to the dismay of survivors and relatives of those who died in the UK’s worst residential fire since the second world war.
If you have any questions relating to this article, please contact Piet van Gelder at [javascript protected email address], Deborah Caldwell at [javascript protected email address] or a member of the construction team.
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